© aajtak.in
Debalina Ghoshal1
The threat emanating from ballistic and cruise missiles have encircled global security dynamics and also influenced security paradigms with new debates and contemporary understandings of its relevance to international security. The use of ballistic missiles in conventional warfare in both urban warfare as well as against counter-force targets, defied the very notion on which such developments were premised: deterrence. Missiles have also started to play critical role for states in asymmetric warfare against non-state actors.
Development of ballistic and cruise missiles has witnessed a surge and while this growth may have strengthened deterrence for one region, it has weakened deterrence in another region. Technological advancements in missile systems have further jeopardised strategic and security equations in regions. Such technological advancements in missile capabilities have had directly proportional impact on the technological advancements in air and missile defence capabilities.
Technology-resistant regimes exist and their successes are noteworthy, but not foolproof. It is in this context that this article illustrates the technology-resistant mechanisms in missile proliferation that promote and encourage non-proliferation efforts by states. Every mechanism for a structured procedure will be subjected to challenges owing to the varied threat perceptions of states, and these technology-resistant regimes are also no exception.
Technology Denial Regimes: An Understanding
Technology denial regimes are those formal frameworks that prohibit or discourage a state from pursuing missile proliferation activities either directly or indirectly. Such regimes could either be legally binding or non-legally binding, but they aim at connecting states in promoting non-proliferation. Such regimes are formed to strengthen non-proliferation mechanisms, but are solely dependent on the goodwill gestures of states parties to such treaties and arrangements. While some of these arrangements could directly impact missile proliferation, many of these arrangements that concern warheads, impact missile proliferation indirectly.
Indirect mechanisms may not necessarily check missile proliferation as states parties to such arrangements could justify their missile developments on grounds that items prohibited by the indirect arrangements are not carried by the missiles as warheads. But for states possessing warheads prohibited under the indirect arrangements, such arrangements are deemed to strengthen deterrence and security.
States could justify indirect arrangements as means to prevent missile development. But this justification could only fructify when the states against whom such arrangements are imposed upon are in acceptance of such arrangements.
Indirect Arrangements
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a treaty that aims to prohibit the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states not only by prohibiting the transfer of such weapons but also by restricting the transfer of certain nuclear energy technologies that could be used to develop nuclear weapons programme. This treaty could prevent states working on a missile technology programme to pursue a nuclear weapons programme thanks to the transfer of technology. It also encourages responsible states to develop missile technologies and also pursue nuclear energy programmes if they meet certain criteria that assures the international system that the energy programmes are not meant for military purposes. Such regulations to ensure safety and security of the nuclear energy cooperation conducted with responsibility are coordinated within the legal framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). France, for example, exports third-generation reactors to avoid safety and proliferation hazards2.
States could also pursue nuclear energy programme under the auspices of Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), but still be capable of pursuing nuclear weapons in near future. SQP is a supplementary protocol implemented on negligible nuclear programmes of states reducing the need for the IAEA to intervene in such states. As an SQP falls under the purview of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), the need for routine inspection is not required. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has rescinded its SQP moving towards a CSA in 2025. According to Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Abdulaziz, Minister of Energy, “the Kingdom’s national legislation and institutional infrastructure satisfy all requirements for controlling nuclear materials and technology, as well as regulating exports, consistent with its obligations and fulfilling its important role under the international non-proliferation regime.”3 Saudi Arabia acquired ballistic missiles from China of the Dong Feng category, including the DF-21s; however, these missiles were modified for conventional roles.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), that entered into force in 1997, is a treaty that bans the development, production, testing, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Chemical weapons could be deployed in missiles for combat roles as seen in the case of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. While the CWC cannot prohibit as such the development of missile capabilities, it could restrict the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by missiles in prohibiting chemical warheads on missile systems. With change in leadership in the recent past in Syria, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) sought mechanisms to discuss the remnants of the chemical weapons programme in Syria with the new Syrian leadership4. Syria ballistic and cruise missile capabilities as well as the presence of chemical weapons that had been developed under the previous Assad regime remained a concern amid regime change. However, under the UN Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), greater efforts need to be taken for ensuring “expeditious destruction” of Syria’s verified chemical weapons programme5. Syria’s accession to the CWC allowed it to acquire voting rights at the OPWC in 20266. Syria’s diplomatic approaches under the interim government of Ahmad-al-Sharaa probably aim for reduced role of firepower and strengthen diplomatic efforts for ensuring peace and stability. In fact, a country that was once a transit for missile proliferation, Syria has now actively intercepted a missile shipment to Lebanon to smuggle arms to Hezbollah7.
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production, testing, stockpiling, and proliferation of biological weapons. but such conventions could only function successfully when all states sign and ratify the same. Missiles with biological warheads like botulinum and anthrax could threaten human lives. One factor that makes missile deterrence with chemical and biological warheads complicated is the fact that such warheads have equipped missile systems and used in warfare.
The Australia Group (AG) is an informal arrangement that prevents the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by controlling the transfer of materials and technology that could be used for the development of these weapons. By preventing the transfer of chemical and biological weapons and related materials, the arrangement aims to limit the scope of missile systems to be equipped with chemical and biological warheads and sub-munitions.
Other indirect arrangements like the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) or the Zangger Committee contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by implementing guidelines for the export of nuclear and nuclear-related technologies. Such export restrictions disable the ability of those states to pursue nuclear weapons that need nuclear material and technology to support their nuclear weapons programme. Under the NPT provisions, states are permitted to provide nuclear related materials to other states but only for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While it is a norm that NPT states parties would abide by NPT guidelines, the risk of such nuclear energy programme proliferating to bigger nuclear weapons programme cannot be eschewed. This is why, in order to strengthen the IAEA safeguards, export controls such as the NSG arrangements can make the development of nuclear weapons difficult and, hence, the scope of employing of missile systems to carry nuclear warheads could be negated. But since this is an indirect mechanism to curb missile development, the arrangement may not have any influence over complete prohibition of missile development programmes.
The Additional Protocol (AP) is a legal document that is negotiated between the IAEA and the individual state that grants further authority to the IAEA for monitoring and verifying the state’s nuclear programme under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, including non-declared activities and facilities8. The AP ensures that non-nuclear weapon states under Article III of the NPT are subjected to full IAEA safeguards. The AP can become a complex arrangement for states pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes but could engage in missile development technology capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the AP allows the IAEA to gain additional access to a state’s nuclear facilities and storage sites. This could make states apprehensive of pursuing clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. While the arrangement does not limit the scope of technological advancements in missile systems for conventional warheads, such arrangements could result in limiting the scope for any technological advancements needed in missile systems to carry nuclear warheads.
The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear test explosions in all environments thanks to global monitoring systems that can detect and deter violations. While the CTBT does enable nuclear threat reduction by making it almost impossible to develop nuclear weapons without test explosions, it may not affect a state’s missile development programme. Such mechanisms could prove dysfunctional against states already in possession of nuclear weapons and having tested them, even though they are party to the CTBT. States could continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals in which missile systems play a crucial role even after becoming parties to the CTBT. However, states that do not join the treaty, such as North Korea, could test their nuclear weapons capabilities and seek for missile capabilities as delivery systems.
Russia revoked ratification of the CTBT in 2023, owing to the United States’ failure to ratify the Treaty after having signed it in 1996.9 This, Moscow believes, provides them with scope to resume explosive testing of nuclear weapons should the United States pursue the same, while Russia claims, at the same time, respect for the existing moratorium on explosive nuclear weapons testing. Russia continued to modernise its nuclear arsenal like all other nuclear powers that had conducted nuclear explosive tests but shifted to non-explosive testing (with laser, computer simulations, etc.) as authorised by the CTBT. One needs to note that, because of the lacking ratification of the CTBT by eight states (the US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, Iran), the treaty cannot enter into force, although its verification system is operating.
Direct Arrangements
Security architecture has become so complex with the introduction of advanced weapon systems, among which missile capabilities, that global functioning systems including state systems as well as global organisations have worked towards carving out mechanisms that could directly curb the threat of ballistic and cruise missiles.
One such arrangement is the Wassenaar Arrangement which was formally established in 1996 and is a voluntary export control regime where member states exchange information on transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies under which missiles and missile systems are also discussed. Direct missile non-proliferation efforts positively impact indirect missile non-proliferation efforts. One positive aspect of this Arrangement is the fact that it continues to “systematically review, update and improve its control lists to ensure their ongoing relevance, taking into account international and regional security developments, technological change, market trends and experience gained.”10
Indeed, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not a static one and is subjected to changes owing to the technological advancements in weapons and associated components. With advancements in technology in weapon components, these features are also included in the Arrangement to ensure that the lucidity of the mechanism to promote non-proliferation remains intact and also to ensure that inclusion of such technologies such as updating mechanisms on rim-driven motors for submarine propulsion, certain types of lasers, high-performance computers and many more11 would negate the need to form another legal arrangement to monitor their proliferation.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal non-treaty association of governments sharing common interests in the non-proliferation of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and related technologies12. The MTCR has added guidelines in which there is “strong presumption” to deny an export if an MTCR member “judges that a missile, whether or not listed in the annex, is intended for use in weapons of mass destruction delivery systems.”13 But such guidelines are only applicable for states that are parties to the regime (currently only 35, not including China, Pakistan or Israel that just pledged to observe the guidelines).
In 2003, the MTCR guidelines were amended to require all partners to have “catch-all” export controls: “These controls form the basis for controlling the export of items not included on a control list when they may be intended for use in connection with delivery systems for WMD other than manned aircraft. Additionally, consistent with the Guidelines, Partners are to exercise particular restraint in consideration of any items on the Annex or of any missiles (whether or not on the Annex) if the exporting government judges that they are intended to be used for WMD delivery – and such exports are to be subject to a strong presumption of denial.14
Category I of MTCR guidelines covers those items that are strictly forbidden for export related purposes while Category II items include less-sensitive items and dual-use missile-related components. However, with advancements in missile technologies, dual-use related components are becoming cumbersome technologies to adhere to the legal parameters. The MTCR does not restrict missile transfer below the range of 300 km. Geographical proximity of borders of many states results in short-range missile systems becoming strategic assets rather than tactical ones.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an arrangement that aims to prevent trafficking of WMD, delivery systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors in order to strengthen non-proliferation. It is assumed to be an important tool to break up the black markets and also detect and intercept the proliferation of WMD and related materials, and then use financial tools to break the proliferation trade that could jeopardise regional and global stability. This initiative was launched in 2003 due to the limitations of the MTCR: in 2002, a Yemen-bound vessel – a Cambodian registered freighter with a North Korea crew that did not use its country flag of registration was boarded by a Spanish crew with the help of a US naval vessel and they discovered fifteen Scud missiles of North Korean origin along with conventional warheads. However, because neither Cambodia, nor Yemen nor North Korea was a member of the MTCR, the international regime could not be applied to these countries and they had to be let free.15 The PSI arrangement thus allowed member countries (now 119) to interdict and seize shipments suspected of including WMD or related material. Such cases included shipments to Libya that led the Khaddafi regime to dismantle its WMD programme and its missile development programme from 2003.
The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), also known as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC), is a political initiative adopted in 2002, now with 145 members, and aimed at curbing the proliferation of ballistic missiles thereby delegitimising their proliferation. The code also has introduced transparency measures on civil rockets as well as ballistic missiles. The code does not call for the destruction of ballistic missiles, but only provides norms of trade for the same. This arrangement is applicable for ballistic missiles and satellite launch vehicles (SLVs). The arrangement covers SLVs as they could be modified to develop ballistic missiles. Even SLV production facilities could be converted for the manufacturing of ballistic missiles.16 Inversely, ballistic missiles could also be converted into anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, threatening space-based assets and leading to scopes of weaponisation of space.
Other direct mechanisms to prevent proliferation of missile systems are United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions that prohibit individual countries from progressing with WMD capabilities including missiles. However, such resolutions are only applicable for states which such resolutions have been implemented upon:
- Under UNSC Resolution 418 (1977), South Africa also gradually gave up its missile development programme along with some WMD capabilities up to the total dismantlement of its nuclear weapons by 1991 as confirmed by the IAEA in 1994.17
- UNSC Resolution 1695 (2006) called for North Korea to suspend any activity related to ballistic missile development.18
- UNSC Resolution 2231 (2015)19 is applicable to Iran, urging that state not to develop ballistic missiles as such developments could lead to the introduction of nuclear-capable missiles into its arsenal.
UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004)20 is different from the above-mentioned ones in that it makes a legal obligation for all Member States of the United Nations to prevent, prohibit and criminalise any access of non-state actors to WMD and related material. It explicitly includes missiles, rockets, and other unmanned systems within its definition of “means of delivery” if they are especially designed to deliver nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
Economic sanctions imposed upon a country are said to pressure it to prevent its missile development programme. Nevertheless, such sanctions could only yield positive results when states are willing to accept the sanctions imposed upon them and work towards minimising missile threats. UNSC sanctions abide by specifications laid out by proliferation-resistant regimes like the MTCR, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In fact, one could rightly argue that UNSC Resolutions only come into play when states refuse to abide by the requisites of the non-proliferation arrangements in missile technology. Whether sanctions affect a state’s missile development capability and impact the missile development programme, depends on whether the state is willing to let the sanctions affect the hard power investments.
Many states may refuse to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, but formulate domestic non-proliferation regimes through national laws. China does not formally adhere to the MTCR but, reportedly, follows its own domestic non-proliferation mechanism in missile technology. States could adhere to global non-proliferation regimes and also carve out their domestic non-proliferation mechanisms to existing close gaps in proliferation mechanisms.
In fact, in 2024, following the “Dual-Use Regulation” of the European Union, the French Ministry of Economy published an order establishing a national list of dual-use items and technologies. The United Kingdom lists all dual-use goods that require licensing for export under the Strategic Export Control Lists with the government’s aim to “make the world a safer place.”21 The United States exercises its domestic mechanisms through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)22. The Export Administration Act (ECA) is implemented through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).23 Such regulations may be even stricter than the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty, regulating the international trade in conventional weapons, including missiles, which the United States has signed but not ratified.
Both direct and indirect mechanisms could prevent horizontal proliferation of missile systems, that is, transfer of missile systems from one state to state or non-state actors. However, such regulations may prevent states from indigenously developing missile technologies and modernising their own existing missile capabilities to suit their doctrinal and operational needs. This process is called “vertical proliferation” or arms build-up.
Conclusion
There are many aspects of non-proliferation that each mechanism addresses through the implementation of legal paradigms that require credible understanding and appreciation for the mechanism. Those states that do not view such mechanisms as just and fair find it difficult to adhere to such regimes and treaties. However, states which feel comfortable adhering to legal norms and principles that promote security and peace through regimes and treaties would adhere to such treaties. A state adhering to one treaty on non-proliferation may not adhere to another treaty promoting non-proliferation. The choice of the state is based on its own security needs and fiscal interests.
But the fact that such legally binding regimes and treaties exist provides for a platform for states to address their concerns. States could choose this platform to voice their support and criticisms irrespective of whether they are parties to the treaty or not. This provides room for improvisation and also in case of any loopholes, separate mechanisms could be formulated. One of the reasons why HCoC had to come into place despite the MTCR existing was the loophole that MTCR did not deal with SLVs. Again, HCoC did not cover the security concerns that cruise missiles create, which are dealt with by the MTCR. Thus, legal regimes are formed to control proliferation by implementing new legal paradigms and filling gaps for existing loopholes.
