©MissileryInfo
Debalina Ghoshal1
Global No-First Use (GFNU) involves processes and policy options for states desiring to opt for a no-first use of nuclear weapons. This means that states would pledge or volunteer not to become the first party to introduce and use nuclear weapons as a war-fighting means.
Thus, states agreeing to such a policy would prohibit themselves through a moratorium on first use of nuclear weapons, but continue to identify such weapons as weapons for deterrence. Relevance of nuclear weapons would not diminish for them, but the reason for such relevance would be altered or limited. This implies that if states viewed nuclear weapons as war-fighting weapons before, post adopting a ‘no-first use’ policy in their nuclear doctrine, they would limit the scope these weapons for war-fighting means. States would focus on strengthening nuclear capabilities for strengthening deterrence in a way that prolongs the resort to such weapons when crises dominate their security equations with adversaries.
This brings us to an interesting cognitive understanding of global no-first use from the lenses of epistemology and ontology. Put in simple words, epistemology focuses on beliefs and assumptions while ontology focuses on the actual reality. This means that there could be gaps existing between virtual beliefs and the existing tangible reality in a given situation and this gap could also be visible between strengthening nuclear deterrence and adopting a ‘global no-first use’ in nuclear doctrines too. The epistemology of adopting ‘global no-first use’ would contain positive outcomes that could include the following:
- Global No-First Use would promote or facilitate nuclear disarmament and arms control;
- Global No-First Use could strengthen strategic stability both regionally and globally;
- Global No-First Use could delay nuclear catastrophe.
Nevertheless, ontology of ‘global no-first use’ could be more complex than the epistemology. Categories of nuclear weapons that threaten nuclear deterrence and stability could aggravate the security dilemma (response to defensive means seen as offensive, leading to an arms race) and delay the process of adopting not only a global no-first use, but also a bilateral no-first use. For instance, tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) defy one of the very crucial elements of deterrence: Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the logic that strengthened deterrence during the Cold War. TNWs do not only destabilize the deterrence quotient vis-à-vis states, but also make ‘global no-first use’ difficult to achieve.
According to Cold War literature, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) ˗ or multiple warheads on means of delivery ˗ are traditionally first-strike weapons because it is expected that this redundancy will succeed in bypassing antimissile defence. Thus, states developing MIRVs find it difficult not only to adhere to ‘no-first use’ doctrine, except China and India with a conditional no-first use doctrine, but also face a complex security framework to continue with nuclear arms control mechanisms. One example of this is the extinction of nuclear arms control treaties between Russia and the United States. Arms control mechanisms could constructively stabilise the nuclear conundrum that would otherwise dominate the security architecture. They could also become a roadmap for adopting ‘no-first use’ doctrines. However, complex nuclear weapons intervene with the progress of ‘no-first use’ doctrines. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that are nuclear capable and impossible to intercept could further make ‘global no-first use’ a utopian dream.
Many states possessing nuclear weapons also view air and missile defence capabilities as weapons to deny adversaries the advantage of retaliation after launching a first or preventive or pre-emptive strike. SSBNs (“Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear”) and submarines run on air-independent propulsion systems and also are viewed by many states as weapons to strengthen survivability against a retaliation of adversaries after striking first so as to be able to launch a second strike.
Nuclear posturing mechanisms that include ‘credible minimum deterrence’ (India) or ‘limited deterrence’ (China) are relative terminologies to strengthen nuclear deterrence. Credibility in nuclear deterrence is a dependent on the acceptance of the adversary regarding the capability of the state to inflict catastrophic damage on the former’s territory. This credibility will keep altering as adversaries make advancements with their nuclear capabilities and as well as ‘defence by denial capabilities.’ This is because states would need to make advancements in their own nuclear arsenals to strengthen deterrence even as they pursue ‘no-first use.’ Even as Beijing transformed its nuclear posturing from ‘minimum deterrence’ to a ‘limited deterrence’ to strengthen its ‘no-first use’ doctrine, it continued to make qualitative and quantitative advancements in nuclear weapons forces and arsenals.
Solutions
Ways to ensure that epistemology becomes ontology:
- Encourage bilateral no-first use: for instance, between Pakistan and India, France and Russia, the United States and Russia, and the United States and China;
- Promote regional no-first use, especially in South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Europe;
- Promote mutual renunciation to the use of TNWs. India and France could lead by example. This is because India has judiciously refrained from developing TNWs despite Pakistan developing 60km range TNWs. In 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron has announced French aspirations to provide nuclear shield to European Union members. However, he has categorically mentioned that such nuclear weapons sharing will be strategic in nature and avoid TNWs for use in nuclear battle.
- Ban the use of MIRVs on land-based missile systems and allow for their deployment only on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to strengthen retaliatory capability and weaken ‘first strike’ capability. This was done by the US and the USSR in the START II treaty in 1993, but the agreement never went into effect and was ultimately cancelled.
- Ban air-launched nuclear capable cruise and ballistic missiles. Nuclear fighters could only carry nuclear bombs as part of nuclear deterrence but this would weaken the scope to launch debilitating nuclear first strikes.
Conclusion
Strategies, policies and postures that are adopted for ‘no-first use’ doctrine often tend to focus on strengthening nuclear deterrence and developing technologically advanced nuclear capabilities should deterrence fail. The gap between epistemology of nuclear no-first use to achieve nuclear disarmament and the ontology to achieve the same is wide. The logic (or rather the belief) that nuclear weapons strengthen deterrence further makes it difficult to achieve ‘global no-first use’ especially as a key to achieve nuclear disarmament. However, because it reduces the risk of use of nuclear weapons, no-first use can be considered as a first step facilitating disarmament due to a lesser fear of nuclear-armed states that they would be submitted to a debilitating first strike.
